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ABSTRACT 
Over the last two decades, cockpits have migrated from 
the traditional analog gauges of moving dials to computer 
displays representing an assortment of flight data.  To keep 
in stride with this modernization trend, the U.S. Navy 
determined that the newest rotary-wing fleet aircraft, the 
MH-60S and MH-60R, would incorporate these advanced cockpit 
designs.  This program was named Common Cockpit. Using 
structured interviews with current Navy MH-60S pilots, and 
analysis of system design models; it was determined that the 
MH-60 glass cockpit has fundamental flaws in cockpit design 
and usability.  One major issue identified is the omission 
of a fully integrated moving map.  The lack of a moving map 
is a serious issue because many of the MH-60 missions 
require precise navigation. The Navy pilots interviewed 
indicated that lack of a moving map makes mission task 
performance difficult and could threaten safety. It is 
argued here that a user-centered design methodology would 
have given ample consideration to including the moving map 
and would have produced a more effective and usable cockpit 
design. Recommendations are made to improve design 
methodology by using Crew-Centered Design methods. 
Recommendations are made regarding modification of existing 
Common Cockpit acquisitions procedures needed to produce a 
better product for the fleet. 
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This thesis will accomplish three fundamental tasks: 
• Using structured interview methods, usability 
engineering techniques and the author’s personal 
expertise, determine if there are any existing 
design or usability issues with the MH-60S Common 
Cockpit 
• In regard to these existing design issues, review 
the methodology under which the design was created 
and recommend a different or modified methodology 
that would create a better design.  Using this 
recommended design methodology, present a 
description of one potential design improvement. 
• In the scope of the Common Cockpit acquisitions 
process, recommend changes to said process that 
would enable a better cockpit to be designed and 
acquired. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The author’s first experience with piloting an aircraft 
came formally in the spring of 1994.  It was at Whiting 
Field, Pensacola, Florida, where he was first introduced to 
the complexities and challenges of piloting an aircraft.  
Following the standard training track, he started with the 
basic single-engine turbo-prop T-34.  Following the fleet 
helicopter replacement pipeline, he then flew the basic 
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helicopter trainer, the TH-57.  Basic flight training was 
followed by training and operational missions in the fleet 
helicopter H-46D Seaknight, where he accrued almost 1,000 
flight hours.  This tour was followed by extensive 
experience in two more fleet aircraft: the H-3 Sea King 
helicopter and the twin-engine fixed-wing utility transport 
C-12B Huron.  His most recent tour was in yet another fleet 
helicopter, the MH-60S Knighthawk. 
Unique to the Knighthawk and a substantial departure 
from previous aircraft was the use of an all-digital “glass” 
cockpit.  Simply put, the traditional analog dials, gauges 
and switches of the previous generation of aircraft have 
been replaced with four LCD monitors and a host of keypads 
and other more “computer interface” oriented input devices. 
To the author, the potential of this transition was 
exciting.  Having seen computers explosively grow in both 
functionality and usability since first being exposed to the 
Radio Shack TRS-80 and Commodore 64 in the mid-1980s, the 
author assumed that a 21st century cockpit must have the 
functionality of any top computing system and the usability 
of the sleekest operating system.  He imagined a cockpit 
where the feel was more like the bridge of the Starship 
Enterprise than the cockpits of the previous generation of 
aircraft he had flown.  The expectation was that everything 
was configurable, selectable, scalable, and absolutely user-
friendly.  Those lofty expectations were not quite met.   
The author encountered a cockpit that did indeed have 
some of these features, but in many aspects seemed lacking.  
To the author and his fellow squadron pilots, there seemed 
to be something fundamentally lacking in the usability of 
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the cockpit itself.  Too often, particularly with new 
pilots, the cockpit seemed a jumbled collection of buttons 
and computer menus.  It was clear that usability had taken a 
back seat to functionality during design.  How could this 
have happened in the Navy’s newest cockpit? 
Following his tour in the Knighthawk, the author opted 
to explore the science behind the computers that drove that 
cockpit.  While studying Computer Science at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, he was exposed to the concepts of Human 
Computer Interfaces.  Armed with knowledge, he arrived at 
the purpose of this thesis. 
C. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Based on informal user interviews and personal 
experience, the MH-60S cockpit has fundamental user design 
and usability issues that potentially impact mission 
accomplishment.  The question is thus: Will the use of a 
more Human Systems Integration (HSI) oriented design 
methodology, applied to the same functional requirements as 
outlined in MH-60S Operational Requirements Document (ORD), 
produce a more usable result? 
Also, can this design methodology be applied throughout 
the acquisitions process in order to not only enhance 
cockpit usability but all human-machine usability? 
 4
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II. A REVIEW OF THE MH-60S AND COMMON COCKPIT 
IN RELATION TO THE ACQUISITIONS PROCESS 
A. COMPUTER EVOLUTION AND COCKPIT INTEGRATION 
The last 20 years of aircraft design and development 
has seen a revolution of sorts.  As computers emerged from 
the large units, common in the 1950s, to the sleek, light 
and low-power units of today, they have also slowly made 
their way into the aircraft.  Today’s modern computer-
integrated or “glass” cockpits almost resemble a computer 
work station more than a traditional cockpit.   
B. HELICOPTERS AT SEA 
Of military fleets in the world, the need to conduct 
sustained operations at sea is the backbone of power 
projection.  In this effort of sustainment, logistics is the 
key.  Fleet logistics is, of course, a little more 
complicated than traditional land logistics since everything 
has to be delivered to ships, which prefer to be at sea.  
One method of doing this is via a delivery technique called 
Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP).  This supply delivery 
procedure involves transferring goods and people from one 
ship to another, shore to ship or ship to shore, by either 
attaching an external load to a helicopter or via an 
internal transfer.  For years, this mission was filled by 
the versatile H-46D Sea Knight (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1.   CH-46D Sea Knight was eventually replaced by 
the MH-60S (From: [1]). 
Although the aircraft was initially intended as a 
logistics platform, as time progressed and the needs of the 
fleet became more varied, the Sea Knight’s mission set 
expanded to include Search and Rescue (SAR), Visit Board 
Search and Seizure (VBSS) and some limited Special 
Operations (SPECOPS). 
By the early 1990s, two things quickly became readily 
apparent to Navy planners: the Sea Knight was rapidly 
exceeding its life expectancy, and the continued growth of 
mission sets was pushing the limits of the airframe.  It was 
time for a replacement.  The answer came in the form of the 
Sikorsky MH-60S (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2.   MH-60S Knighthawk doing VERTREP duties (From: 
[2]). 
C. MH-60S PROGRAM 
1. General Description 
The MH-60S is an all-weather multi-mission helicopter 
built as an amalgam of UH-60 Blackhawk and SH-60 Seahawk 
components.  First deployed in January 2003, the MH-60 
Knighthawk is designed to conduct a varied mission suite 
including Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM), Logistics 
(LOG) and a more aggressive mission known as Combat Search 
and Rescue (CSAR, also known as Armed Helo or AH) [14].  
Characteristics are summarized in Table 1. 
 8
 
Table 1.   MH-60S Characteristics (From: [14]). 
2. Program History 
The MH-60S was born out of a recognized need in the 
early 1990s to replace several aging helicopter platforms.  
By the end of the cold war, the Navy was operating eight 
types of helicopters [17].  All were specialized for 
different missions, including Vertical Replenishment 
(VERTREP) and logistics (LOG), Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW), 
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) and Naval Special Warfare 
(NSW) [4].  Of the fleet helicopters, the H-1N, H-3 and H-46 
and HH-60H were either very near or approaching the end of 
their service lives [18]. 
Conventional naval rotary-wing aviation urban legend 
holds that around this time, seeing an opportunity to reduce 
operating costs and increase mission flexibility, the Navy 
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initiated a program that would pare down the existing 
diverse helicopter fleet to just two variants of the 
Sikorsky H-60 (Figure 3).  As this section will chronicle, 
this simple interpretation of history is not quite the case. 
 
 
Figure 3.   The Helo Master Plan (From: [3]). 
The CH-60, as the MH-60S was originally known, had it 
roots in the late 1980s and early 1990s discussions 
revolving around the Marine Corps vertical Medium Lift 
Replacement (MLR) project [19].  At the time, the Marine 
Corps was funding the development of the Boeing MV-22 medium 
lift tilt rotor to replace its aging CH-46E medium lift 
helicopter fleet.  While Secretary of Defense under 
President George H.W. Bush, Mr. Dick Cheney attempted to 
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terminate the V-22 program due to cost overruns.  His 
solution to the MLR was the Sikorsky CH-60 [19]. 
After a protracted battle, the Marine Corps eventually 
won and continued its plan to acquire the MV-22.  Sikorsky, 
however, continued to shop its CH-60 to all four services 
[20].  In specific reference to the Navy portion of the 
Sikorsky proposal, Inside the Army writes: 
As for the Navy, Sikorsky contends the service's 
fleet support helicopter assets "are aging and 
experiencing accelerated attrition." The Navy has 
some recapitalization plans in place -- such as 
an upgrade to its fleet of CH-46s and procurement 
of a new helicopter beginning in FY-98 -- but 
Sikorsky anticipates an upcoming cost and 
operational effectiveness analysis will "have 
difficulty dealing with the cost effectiveness" 
of them. [20] 
Inside the Army continues: 
Some observers theorize that the Sikorsky 
proposal is merely an effort to stave off a halt 
in the Black Hawk production line should the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense not give the 
Army additional money for Black Hawk procurement 
in FY-97. [20] 
By 1996, Sikorsky had grown desperate to push the CH-60 
multi-service program, or at the very least extend the 
manufacture of Army UH-60 Black Hawk program [21].  They 
felt their life depended on it: 
There is trouble down the road [for Sikorsky],a 
company official said last week. "Without Black 
Hawk procurement, it would be difficult for 
Sikorsky to continue as a company." He added that 
Black Hawk procurement could total as much as 
$1.1 billion over the next five years.  "And 
right now Sea Hawk production has stopped and the 
CH-53 procurement is not significant," he 
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continued, "and there really is no future program 
except the [SH-60R] . . . so, no, there's not a 
lot of business right now for Sikorsky.  The 
draft briefing charts prepared by the Program 
Analysis and Evaluation shop state flatly that 
the ‘Cancellation of UH-60 buys may affect 
Sikorsky's survival, and has cost implications 
for the Army's RAH-66 Comanche.’ [21] 
The Army had originally planned to buy 36 Black Hawk 
helicopters per year during fiscal years 1998–2003 but had 
shifted these monies to other priorities [21]. 
This mess quickly drew in the Marine Corps again, this 
time in their effort to update the UH-1N.  The original 
Marine plan was to update both the UH-1 and AH-1 to the N 
and W models, respectively.  This upgrade would leverage an 
already existing training and supply system while upgrading 
the cockpits and engine/rotor combination [22].  The Office 
of the Sectary of Defense (OSD), headed by Mr. William 
Perry, however, wanted to keep the Sikorsky production lines 
open and continued to push the CH-60 as an alternative to 
the UH-1. 
Angered by the Army’s move to halt UH-60 Black Hawk 
production, the OSD drafted a plan to take the almost $1 
billion originally scheduled for the UH-60 and give it to 
the Navy or Marine Corps to fund the CH-60, a predominately 
Black Hawk variant.  The Marines balked yet again, 
preferring to stick with their original upgrade plans for 
the Cobra and Huey [23]. 
The Navy, however, saw an opportunity to solve several 
of their helicopter problems with one solution.  Starting in 
1995, the Navy starting drafting the “Navy Helo Master Plan” 
(HMP)[4].  The HMP morphed out of a Center for Naval 
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Analysis (CNA) study that looked at the Navy’s helicopter 
force structure and what would be required to transition to 
the future.  The initial HMP roadmap didn’t include the CH-
60 (Figure 4) but, once word of a potential “free” Black 
Hawk variant was out, the plan was quickly revised (Figure 
5).  The H-60B/F airframe that was currently in use was not 
considered since that particular production line had already 
been shuttered.  The replacement for the H-60B/F, named the 
MH-60R was also not considered since that production line 
wasn’t scheduled to start running until early in first 
decade of 2000 and would do nothing to keep the Blackhawk 
line open.  This move to “give” the Navy a “free” airframe 
virtually locked in the CH-60 as the helicopter of choice 
for the Navy since the entire Navy helicopter roadmap 


















Figure 4.   Original Helo Master Plan (From: [4]). 
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Figure 5.   Revised Helo Master Plan based on the CH-60 
acquisition (From: [4]). 
The HMP momentum resulted in a sole source Request For 
Proposal (RFP) for Sikorsky being issued in 1996 [24].  In 
fiscal year (FY) 1997, Congress directed Sikorsky Aircraft 
(SAC) to produce a demonstration aircraft [25].  This 
Operational Assessment (OA) demonstrator was a combination 
of the existing UH-60L Blackhawk airframe with H-60 Seahawk 
components [26].  Between November 1997 and January 1998, a 
successful Operational Assessment (OA) directed by 
Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force (COTF) was 
conducted [25].  This success led to the program receiving a 
Mile Stone II (MSII) (Milestone B equivalent)/Low Rate 
Initial Production (LRIP) go-ahead decision in July 1998 and 
Sikorsky being named as the sole source contractor on 
October 6, 1998.  The contract was under the existing U.S. 
Army Aviation & Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal as the 
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contracting activity [27].  It should be noted that during 
the OA, “Neither approved nor signature-ready ORD 
(Operational Requirements Document) or TEMP (Test and 
Evaluation Master Plan) documents were available during the 
November 1997–January 1998 OA period” [28, p. 2] and draft 
documents were used as a guideline.  
Designated an Acquisitions Category IC (ACAT IC) 
program by the Under Sectary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology & Logistics (USD(AT&L)) in July of 1998 [25], the 
program quickly ramped up.  The all new production CH-60S 
first flight followed in January 2000 [14], [29].  The CH-
60S was quickly re-designated the MH-60S to reflect the 
multi-mission capability of the airframe [14].  Three 
distinct mission sets were designed in and called “blocks”. 
Block I reflected the general logistics mission, block II 
was modified to conduct Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) 
and block III incorporated the more offense Armed Helo (AH) 
mission kits [7].  By FY 2008, 132 airframes had either been 
ordered or fielded to Navy squadrons.  The current plans 
call for a total of 237 [14]. 
D. THE COMMON COCKPIT 
1. History 
As the new CH-60 started production and the planned MH-
60R (scheduled for production in 2000 [21] firmed up, the 
Navy decided to make the technological leap to an all 
digital, or “glass,” cockpit display for both the MH-60S and 
MH-60R helicopters.  This cockpit, designed for use on both 
airframes to enhance commonality [29], was named the Common 
Cockpit (CC).  At this point, the CC was notional and lacked 
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any specific ORD type document of its own.  At this point 
the MH-60R was the more mature of the two programs and thus 
it can be concluded that initial efforts for the CC were 
applied toward MH-60R functional requirements. 
Initially included as part of the MH-60S Operational 
Requirements Document (ORD) [30] as well as the MH-60R ORD, 
the CC was spun-off as an “845” contact prior to 2002 [31].  
An 845 contract referrers to “10 U.S.C. 2371, Section 845, 
Authority to Carry Out Certain Prototype Projects.” [32]  
Per the OT Guide: 
Other “Transactions” for prototype projects are 
acquisition instruments that generally are not 
subject to the federal laws and regulations 
governing procurement contracts.  As such, they 
are not required to comply with the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), its supplements, or 
laws that are limited in applicability to 
procurement contracts.  [32, p. 8] 
Due to its designation as an 845 program, funding, 
particularly Research and Development (R&D) costs, are 
difficult to define.  According to [33], Lockheed Martin was 
awarded a $423 million contract to produce common cockpits 
for the MH-60S and MH-60R.  This amount, however, may not 
include R&D costs, since this is a production (APN-1) 
contract and usually does not include research and 
development costs.  For certain, prior to the contract 
award, $70.53 million had been spent, at least in part, on 
R&D [34]. Other R&D costs may be included in the Sierra and 
Romeo development costs but are not clearly defined [35]. 
CC requirements are also scattered throughout the 
Sierra and Romeo ORDs and hard to concisely determine.  As 
an initially cobbled-together program, the CC currently 
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lacks a clearly defined requirements document such as the 
MH-60S ORD.  As of this writing, however, there is a push to 
formalize these requirements [35], [36]. 
2. Description 
The Common Cockpit (Figure 6) is made up of several 
components including Multi-Function Displays (MFD), Fixed-
























Figure 6.   MH-60S Block I Common Cockpit (From: [5]). 
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Figure 7.   PKI / FFK located in the lower consol area of 
the CC (From: [5]). 
According to [14]: 
The CC includes four 8in x 10in active matrix 
liquid crystal displays and dual programmable 
operator keysets. The avionics includes dual 
flight management computers and an audio 
management computer. The navigation suite 
includes a Northrop Grumman (Litton) LN-100G dual 
embedded global positioning system and inertial 
navigation system.   
 20
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III. INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY 
Based on an in-depth knowledge of the subjects by the 
author, himself an experienced U.S. Navy pilot, a structured 
interview method was chosen to obtain needed U.S. Navy Fleet 
pilot inputs on the MH-60 design. The interview method 
selected is based on several considerations as described in 
[15, p. 9] and elaborated below.  Interview data is 
summarized in Appendix A.  Raw interview data is found in 
Appendix B.   
A. INTERVIEW SUBJECTS AND PROCEDURES 
Nine subjects were interviewed over a three-day period 
from October 27, 2008, to October 29, 2008.  Subjects were 
all pilots from the MH-60S West Coast Fleet Replacement 
Squadron, Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 11 stationed at 
Naval Air Station, North Island, San Diego, California.  
Eight of the subjects were instructor pilots and one was a 
student pilot nearing the end of the training syllabus.  
Pilot experience is summarized in Table 2.  Of nine subjects 
interviewed two were qualified Helicopter Aircraft Commander 
(HAC) in a different aircraft model.  Table 2 summarizes 

















1200 30 Yes 
1200 1000 No 
1370 250 Yes 
1300 1000 No 
1450 1200 No 
275 100 No 
1550 1350 No 
1250 1000 No 
1300 900 No 
Table 2.   Subject summary data. 
Interviews were conducted in a HSC-11 briefing room 
well known to all nine subjects.  All interviews were 
conducted during normal working hours (0800–1500).  
Questions were formulated by the author based on his expert 
knowledge as an aviator and was tailored to efficiently 
capture not only subject facts, opinions, attitudes and 
answers but also the reasoning behind the answer.  In short, 
the author based the interview questions on what he thought 
would make sense if he were in the subject’s position.  The 
complete Interview Summary in Appendix A and raw interview 
notes are found in Appendix B. 
B. INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY RATIONAL 
The primary interview consideration in regard to the 
subject pool was an attempt to get a somewhat representative 
picture from all fleet squadrons.  There are currently seven 
squadrons flying the MH-60S.  Three squadrons are located in 
San Diego, CA, three in Norfolk, VA, and one in Guam.  
Mission sets for each squadron vary depending on the 
deployment and are not equally distributed throughout the 
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squadrons.  Thus a pilot of one squadron may encounter 
significant different operating conditions of another pilot 
in another squadron.  The pilot population of each squadron 
is roughly 40.  In total, there are roughly 280 active MH-
60S pilots in the fleet at any one time, all with different 
skill sets and mission experiences.  It should be noted that 
all pilots initially train to the same skill sets in the 
FRS.  Squadrons, based on their operating requirements, may 
perform these mission sets more or less frequently.  For 
example, HSC-25 in Guam is the primary SAR asset for the 
Northern Marinas Islands.  Thus, it prosecutes significantly 
more search and rescues than her sister squadrons in the 
continental United States, where the Coast Guard has primary 
SAR responsibilities. 
With this diversity in squadrons in mind, HSC-3, the 
West Coast MH-60S Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) was 
chosen.  Instructors are comprised of a mix of aviators from 
all the HSC fleet squadrons, thus ensuring a singular point 
of view of a particular squadron experience or geographic 
area would not be represented exclusively.  The FRS 
instructor pilot pool offered the unique advantage of 
collecting the most skilled pilots throughout the HSC 
community and depositing them in one centralized location.  
Mission diversification among interview subjects is 












Table 3.   Mission experience among interview subjects.  
Subjects are often familiar with more than one mission 
area. 
The audience, in this case experienced fleet aviators, 
was well known to and as well understood by the author (who 
was also the interviewer).  As indicated, the author is also 
an experienced fleet aviator, and has flown the same 
model/type/series as the interview subjects.  Of the several 
types of interview methods presented in [15], an informal 
in-person interview was chosen based on the advantages 
outline in Table 2.  Per [15, p. 14], the author felt that 
open-ended questions, in which the key component of the 
question would be the insight that led the respondent to 
that conclusion, were of the most value for the purposes of 
this study.   
Each interview was conducted with a written script in 
which notes were taken by the interviewer (Appendix A).  The 
subjects were familiar with their particular cockpit 
environment, but were unfamiliar with certain Human Cockpit 
Interface (HCI) terminology and concepts.  The author felt 
that if the subjects had a better understanding of different 
interface options, a more frank and revealing discussion 
would be the result. 
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Finally, following guidelines established in Table 4, a 
quiet, private interview room was used.  In this case it was 
a briefing space which the pilots were both familiar with 
and provided convenient access as it was located in the 
squadron spaces.  Based on the experience of the 
interviewer, pilots are relaxed and more open to discussion 
in a familiar environment. 
 
Characteristics Done with a written script  
Advantages Can explore answers with respondents 
Can assist respondents with unfamiliar 
words and concepts 
Special Needs Requires a quiet area to conduct the 
interviews 
Table 4.   In-person informal interview attributes (After: 
[15]). 
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IV. INTERVIEW RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. INTERVIEW RESULTS SUMMARY 
The interview method described in Chapter III does not 
necessarily lend itself to easily quantifiable summary data 
as the bulk of the information is pilot comments about 
particular systems or cockpit tasks.  These comments did 
tend to group in to several general areas of interest.  
Topics were: 
• All nine subjects expressed the need for a MFD 
integrated moving map to aide in performing critical 
navigation tasks and for maintaining adequate 
situational awareness across the entire spectrum of 
missions.  Eight of nine interviewees had some 
experience with the Digital Map Kneeboard (discussed 
in Chapter V) which was developed independently from 
the cockpit instrument suite. Interviewees stated 
that the kneeboard device was a poor substitute for 
a fully integrated moving map. Pilots believed that 
use of the knee board version was cumbersome and 
presented a significant disruption to their normal 
scan pattern.  They all stated that integrating the 
functionality of the DMK in to the Multi-Function 
Display (MFD) would be the optimal solution based on 
their aviation experiences with cockpit scan 
patterns and the elimination of the distractions 
caused by “head-down” cockpit tasks.  The negative 
effects of this type of cockpit activity will be 
discussed in Chapter V.   
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• Five of nine subjects expressed dissatisfaction with 
the current implementation of the Forward Looking 
Infrared (FLIR). 
• Four of nine subjects felt the current Programmable 
Key Interface (PKI)/Fixed Function Key (FFK) user 
interface was difficult to use. 
• Four of nine subjects felt there were readability 
issues with various aspects of the digital flight 
and malfunction indication displays.  
A more in-depth summary is outlined in Appendix A, and 
raw interview data is found in Appendix B.   
B. GENERAL INTERVIEW DISCUSSION 
The interview process was revealing to say the least.  
Topics ranged from display symbology color to menu depth.  A 
more detailed summary of these topics are presented in 
Appendix A.  With every subject, however, the interview 
quickly turned to the issue of geo-referencing the aircraft 
during missions.  Of the eight subjects familiar with the 
DMK, all eight stated that the usability of a moving map 
would be greatly enhanced if it was implemented on the MFD 
instead of the DMK.  Two subjects recommended replacing the 
center back-up instruments and replacing it with a fifth MFD 
used solely for geo-positioning while another requested 
robust viewing options including ego and exocentric views. 
In the course of the interview process, it became very 
clear to the author that this thesis would not be a simple 
or straightforward usability analysis on an existing cockpit 
function or task.   
 29
The focus of this thesis quickly turned to an 
exploration as to why user expectations were not met in the 
MH- 60 aircraft regarding the incorporation of a mission 
critical information display (specifically, the need for a 
MFD moving map). The author then set out to answer the 
question of how the U.S. Navy pilots could be so grossly 
under-serviced and how this problem could be rectified in 
future acquisitions projects.  To that end, the remainder of 
this thesis will focus on the issues surrounding the design 
methodology used during the MH-60 development, and dedicate 
efforts toward ascertaining what went wrong and how aircraft 
system design and acquisition methods could be improved. We 
will first begin with the discussion of the importance of 
moving maps. 
C. SPECIFIC DISCUSSION ON MOVING MAPS 
One item of particular interest was a theme for which 
all nine subjects expressed as a concern: the need for a 
usable moving map.  Seven subjects directly commented that 
the current implementation of this functionality, the 
Digital Map Kneeboard (DMK) was not a practical solution due 
to usability issues and was thus not used.  One of those 
that did not comment on the usability of the DMK had never 
used the device and the other thought it was a useful 
situational awareness tool for non-pilot aircrew in the 
back.  The drawbacks of the kneeboard DMK solution will be 
explored in Chapter V. 
Regardless of the mission, all nine subjects stated 
that some form of a map, or a way for the pilot to maintain 
geographic situational awareness, was a must to keep the 
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pilots from cognitive overload given the complexity of the 
missions they were flying.  This will be further discussed 
below. 
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V. MOVING MAPS AND THE COMMON COCKPIT DESIGN 
METHODOLOGY 
A. MOVING MAP RATIONAL 
Before discussing a moving map specific to the Common 
Cockpit, a discussion on the generalities of moving maps is 
warranted. 
1. Moving Maps 
In general, moving maps all provide the same 
information: a representation of the relationship between 
the location of the user and a specific geographic area in 
which the user is located.  As the user’s position changes, 
the map adjusts to keep the user’s geospatial position and 
thus geospatial awareness accurate.   
The benefits of moving maps as an enhancement to 
situational awareness in general are well understood by both 
government and private agencies and will not be discussed in 
this paper.  This paper will specifically discuss moving 
maps in relation to general U.S. military flight profiles. 
The U.S. military recognized the need for a moving map 
as far back as 1979.  The first digital map was created by 
Harris Corporation for the U.S. Air Force F-117 Nighthawk.  
Since then, moving maps have been installed by several 
different companies on aircraft, such as the C-130, F-16, 
F/A-18, AH-1Z, UH-1Y and the AH-64, to name a few [37]. 
MH-60S and MH-60R mission sets were briefly outlines in 
Chapter II.  In review, the missions vary for purely over 
water actions including Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) to 
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overland missions such as Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR or 
AH).  From the author’s experience, seldom do these missions 
cover exclusively one type of geography over another, but 
instead start in one geographic region and end in another.  
This can be attributed to the fact that Navy helicopters are 
often ship-based but work in the littorals.  Even in the 
case of open water operations, artificial boundaries are 
instantiated by naval battle groups to de-conflict 
dissimilar operations.  An example of this would be ensuring 
low-flying aircraft such as helicopters do not inadvertently 
wander in the carrier landing pattern of much faster fixed-
wing aircraft.  Even purely ASW work requires to some extent 
knowledge of sea bottom topography.  Lockheed Martin came to 
this same conclusion while analyzing the MH-60R requirements 
for the ASW mission and initiated an Independent Research 
and Development (IRAD) project to explore possible 
implementations [38]. 
Generally, from the author’s experience, a sizable 
portion of Navy flying is either overland or in close 
proximity to some form of land mass or relevant geographical 
partitioning.  This may include international maritime 
boarders as well as designated “restricted” areas where 
entry would violate national or international flight 
regulations.  Thus, one should conclude that geographical 
situational awareness is applicable to both overland and 
oversea mission sets and is thus entirely applicable to the 
MH-60S and MH-60R and their associated missions.  
2. Moving Map MH-60S Implementation 
With the corporate understanding of the benefits of 
moving maps prevalent in the helicopter community and 
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aviation in general, the question is begged on how did a 
moving map get overlooked in the original common cockpit 
design process? 
Prior to [30], the U.S. Navy never specifically 
identified a moving map solution to navigation and other 
functional requirements defined in the ORD.  This has the 
potential to make a coherent human-cockpit interface design 
difficult and recommendations on this approach will be 
discussed later.  Sprinkled throughout the ORD were numerous 
requirements to display some type of geo-spatial information 
to the crew.  For example, section 4.2.1.1, in discussing 
the Airborne Mine Counter Measures (AMCM) functional 
requirements states the following: 
A precise helicopter AMCM minefield navigation 
system is required to accurately determine, 
display, record and report geo-spatial position 
of mine-like object… cockpit displays shall 
provide the capability for the aircrew to 
maneuver the helicopter along a desired/selected 
track. [30] 
Consideration was given to an integrated moving map for 
the Common Cockpit prior to [30].  Tasked by the Navy, Naval 
Research Laboratory did discuss the need for an integrated 
moving map for the MH-60S in 2001.  Although the initial 
plan was to implement the first MH-60S moving map to support 
the CSAR mission, the major thrust of the program was to 
help support the ASW and MCM mission [39].  The push for the 
moving map was also driven by the success that moving maps 
had in providing heightened situational awareness in the 
F/A-18 Hornet and AV-8B Harrier [40]. 
Prior to production aircraft 120, the possibility of 
MFD integrated moving map was moot.  The first generation of 
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the Common Cockpit included as part of its hardware a key 
computing device called the Flight Mission Computer (FMC) 
that lacked sufficient computing power to implement a moving 
map [41].  Per [5], the FMCs “are provided for information 
processing and data management.  The FMCs execute Flight 
Management Program (FMP) software and provide all flight 
management functions” [5, p. VII-15-20]. Since production 
aircraft 120, however, the all FMCs in new production 
aircraft, as well as fleet aircraft, have been replaced 
with the Mission Computer (MC), which is capable of driving 
the necessary hardware and software to utilize the hardware 
map features already located on the MFDs [41],[42]. 
Even with the temporary technical limitation posed by 
the FMC, the reason that a moving map was not an initial 
requirement in the Common Cockpit is still not completely 
clear.  As discussed above, the benefits of a moving map are 
well known and would have been one of the fundamental issues 
discussed by any design team based on ORD functional 
requirements.  Thus, the cockpit design methodology should 
at the least have driven the inclusion of the moving map 
requirement once technical limitations were overcome.  Why 
didn’t it?  One possible reason could be the cockpit design 
process used by Lockheed Martin. 
3. Lockheed Martin Cockpit Design Methodology 
According to [43], Lockheed Martin loosely followed in-
house systems engineering design methodology titled “Process 
Guidance Series—System Engineering: Human-Computer Interface 




standard throughout the industry and eventually became 
formalized as the Department of Defense Architecture 
Framework (DoDAF), Version 1.0.   
It should be noted that without a singular first-hand 
view of the entire Common Cockpit design process or clear 
documentation at every step, it is impossible to accurately 
map each individual design stage to the components of the 
Lockheed Martin methodology.  Methodology is further 
obscured by the fact that exact composition of each group 
(Human Factors Engineering, Software Engineering, etc.), as 
delineated in [6], cannot be accurately determined within 
the scope of this thesis.  That said, documentation provided 
by Lockheed Martin to the autho,r as well as [43], indicates 
that this methodology was generally followed.  It should 
also be noted that according to [44] the specifics of human 
factors are “greatly influenced by customer requirements and 
expectations.” 
a. Lockheed Martin Process Guidance Series 
Systems Engineering: Human-Computer 
Interface Requirements (HCIRS) Overview 
Lockheed Martin’s design methodology is a systems 
engineering approach to all encompassing approach to Human 
Computer Interface (HCI).  It uses a straightforward 
iterative design process for development, design and test 
implementations of HCI requirements. 
b. Systems Engineering Process 
Reference [6] is a framework to help system 
engineers develop a usable HCI for users of any type of 
computer system and is not specific to aviation 
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applications.  It provides “recommended contents for those 
sections of a system, subsystem, configuration item, or 
interface requirements specification used in documenting HCI 
requirements [6, p. 7].  These recommended contents are 
outlined in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.   Lockheed Martin Human Computer Interface 
Requirements (HCIRS) contents (From: [6]). 
Per [6], the contents are meant to describe the 
interface between the user and the system.  The “how” of 
software and hardware design is documented in separate 
specifications [6]. 
c. The Iterative Process 
Reference [6] has divided the design process in to 
eight distinct steps (Figure 9). 
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Figure 9.   Lockheed Martin eight step HCI design process 
(From: [6]). 
As stated earlier, this process is both sequential 
and iterative.  Design teams will make decisions, review 
them with users and modify these designs an indeterminate 
number of times until a consensus is reached as to meeting 
the functionality of that particular system.  “User 
evaluations of the prototype are conducted at various 
iterations to obtain users’ feedback early and incorporate 
it into the design, as appropriate” [6].  Iteration occurs 
between steps three and eight of the design process.   
Step three is the step in which “functional 
allocation” occurs.  Here, “functions are allocated to 
humans or to machines” [6, p. 27].  Allocation decisions are 
based on several criteria including human and machine 
limitations and data from functional analysis, as well as 
past engineering experience and cost-effectiveness of 
design.  To some extent, the remainder of the iterate 
process refine this mapping of functions to functionality 
and get it to work in the context of usability.  This in 
turn makes step three the most crucial to the entire 
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iterative process.  Any missteps here may prove 
irrecoverable for the remainder of the process until 
iteration returns to the starting point.  This logic can 
also be applied to the non-iterative part of this process 
starting at step one (Generate Operational Concept).  If the 
concept is mal-formed, the entire process will thus be 
malformed since there is no way to recover without a 
complete re-initialization of the entire design process.   
In summary, the reader should keep in mind that 
the ultimate goal of this design process is to map required 
system functionality (step 3 of Figure 9) to a specific 
functionality within the final design (step 8 of Figure 9).  
Once this criterion is met, it is possible to declare the 
system goals complete.  This means that unless a very 
specific moving map requirement was specified (which was not 
the case in the original MH-60S ORD), the final design could 
vary widely and would most likely be the best solution from 
an engineering standpoint, not necessarily a usability 
standpoint. 
4. Digital Map Kneeboard (DMK) 
The introduction of Block II and III production models 
and the implementation of the Armed Helo mission brought 
the need for a moving map to the forefront.  Hamstrung by 
the FMC limitation as discussed in Chapter V, NAVAIR opted 
to integrate a kneeboard moving map and introduced a change 
to the MH-60S ORD that specifically outlined a kneeboard 
moving map specification [30].  Section 4.3.9 of [30] 
defines the requirement: 
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A kneeboard moving map which is useable during 
both unaided and Night Vision Device (NVD) flight 
will provide digital navigation for each pilot.  
The aircraft will be modified to provide primary 
navigation (either INS or GPS) position 
information and power supply to support the 
moving map.  The MH-60S kneeboard moving map 
shall be capable of pre-flight loading and in-
flight display of National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) raster product format 
data and vector data that incorporates and 
overlays geo-referenced navigation and waypoint/ 
flight data onto a common map background.  The 
moving map shall be capable of input and output 
in either latitude/longitude or Military Grid 
Reference System (MGRS).  When the Navy 
implements the Common Grid Reference System 
(CGRS), it will be incorporated into the moving 
map system.  A cockpit moving map display greatly 
increases pilot situational awareness.  A self-
contained moving map system will be an objective 
system for the MH-60S.  
If a need for moving map was realized in the ORD, why 
was the kneeboard solution incorporated and not the “self-
contained moving map solution” described above as the final 
solution?  Before this question can be answered, a brief 
discussion of the DMK will be undertaken to orient the 
reader with the kneeboard solution.   
a. Digital Map System 
The answer to the Change 2 ORD requirement was the 
Digital Map System (DMS).  Developed by Vertical-flight 
Systems, Test Analysis and Research (VSTAR), a government 
owned facility, the DMS consists of three distinct 
components (Figure 8 and Figure 9): a Digital Map Junction 
Unit (DMJU), a Digital Map Loading System (DMLS) and three 
Digital Map Keyboards (DMK) [7]. 
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Figure 10.   DMS (From: [7]). 
 
Figure 11.   Current fleet DMK.  Pen included for size 
reference only. 
The current kneeboard moving map implementation 
was an offshoot of an older Fujitsu touchpad laptop that had 
been tested previously.  Based on this concept the current 
kneeboard was designed and prototyped by NAVAIR during 2004.  
Production of operational models was handled by the Army 
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(AMRDEC) Aviation and Missile Research, Development and 
Engineering Center—Prototype Integration Facility (PIF) in 
Huntsville (Redstone Arsenal), Alabama [45]. 
Designed to be worn on the pilot’s thigh while 
seated in the aircraft, the kneeboard is approximately the 
size a medium-sized book or standard military kneeboard in 
length, width and thickness (Figure 11 and Figure 12) and 
weighs around four pounds [8].  User Human Machine Interface 
(HMI) controls consist of an 8.5-inch (diagonal) resistive 
touch screen, on/off switch, touch screen disable switch, 
backlight control and right mouse click switch.  Software 
consists of Microsoft Windows XP© running the AN/AYQ -26 
Topographic Support Set (Figure 13).  This set integrates 
aircraft navigation data with respect to digital maps [7], 
Forward Looking InfraRed (FLIR) composite video input, two 
10/100 Ethernet ports and a MIL-STD-1553B Data Collection 
PCB [8]. 
 




Figure 13.   DMK Specifications (After: [8]). 
Of particular interest is the integration of the 
mission planning software FalconView© to the DMK.  
FalconView© is a common tool used by aircrew across all the 
services for mission planning. 
b. Pilots Likes/Dislikes and Limitations of 
Heads-down Devices  
The in the scope of the interview conducted for 
this thesis, the DMK was universally discounted by all 
pilots interviewed as a useful front seat tool for any type 
of relevant geospatial situational awareness information.  
Based on comments documented in Appendix B, this is 
primarily due to the heads-down nature of the DMK.  
Interview subjects reiterated that the DMK was much more a 
distraction than help to mission accomplishment. 
This finding is not surprising.  The negative 
impact of any heads-down activity in a cockpit is well 
documented and blamed for a number of aircraft mishaps [46] 
analyzed National Transportation and Safety Board accounts 
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of accidents attributed to crew error.  Of those reported, 
“nearly half of these accidents involved lapses of attention 
associated with interruptions, distractions, or 
preoccupation with one task to the exclusion of another 
task.”  Of these distracting activities, four categories 
were defined:  
• both internal and external communication 
• searching for VMC traffic 
• responding to abnormal situations 
• head-down work 
Reference [46] also analyzed 107 of NASA’s 
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) reports that 
involved competing tasks.  Sixty-nine percent of these 
reports were attributed to “either failure to monitor the 
current status or position of the aircraft, or failure to 
monitor the actions of the pilot who was flying or taxing” 
[46].  In 35 of the ASRS reports, the pilot not flying was 
distracted from monitoring the flying pilot from other 
tasks, of which 13 involved some kinds of head-down 
activity. 
Airbus also conducted a review of safety reports 
and found similar data [16].  Based on the U.S. Aviation 
Safety Action Program (ASAP), Airbus stated that 
“interruptions and distractions are the main threat facing 
flight crews.”  Airbus defines a threat as “a condition that 
affects or complicates the performance of a task or the 




ASRS, Airbus calculated that head-down activity accounted 
for 16-22 percent of the factors involved in interruptions 
and distractions, as listed in Table 5 [16]. 
 
Table 5.   Interruption and distraction factors (From: [16]). 
The effect of these interruptions and 
distractions, in which head-down activity comprises almost a 
quarter, is to “break the flow of ongoing cockpit 
activities,” including [16]: 
• Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
• Normal Checklists 
• Communications 
• Monitoring tasks 
• Problem solving activities  
The effects of head-down activity and the 
resultant laundry list of consequences above are no surprise 
to seasoned fleet aviators.  Limiting head-down activity to 
a minimum is a golden rule taught in flight school and 
constantly reiterated during countless safety briefs and 
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squadron level training.  The head-down environment is so 
distracting that announcing that the non-flying pilot is 
“heads-down” is very common practice and highlights the need 
for extra vigilance by the flying pilot as well as other 
flight crewmembers.  Physiological affects aside, head-down 
is not an activity that should be performed often in the 
cockpit. 
This knowledge of the inherent dangers of head-
down can also be interpreted from the U.S. Navy’s own 
research into glass cockpits.  In researching moving-map 
systems for multi-functional helicopter missions, the Naval 
Research Laboratory did not even consider a kneeboard 
application and instead focused its research on an in-dash 
MFD integrated solution [47],[40]. 
Finally, [48] describes one of the potential 
hazards of advanced interfaces interfering with aircrew 
situational awareness.  It warns that “too much programming 
and head down times [that] takes place at low altitude, and 
during time of intense tactical activity,” is a concern when 
developing a new interface system (p. 8). 
c. Planned Obsolesce of the DMK 
Although sold as a solution to the moving map 
issue, NAVAIR did recognize that it was not the ideal 
solution.  Per [7] and [30] this implementation of moving 
map functionality was inferior to a MFD integrated solution: 
“but the ultimate solution would be to integrate the moving 
map system into the normal OSI on the mission display [7], 
p. 10].”   
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Other than the fact of denying the users of the 
MH-60S access to a known superior navigation system in the 
hear and now, planning for a major systems change after the 
aircraft has started full-rate production is an expensive 
proposition and a well-known acquisitions “no-no” and 
harkens to the now-defunct serial-approach acquisitions 
process.  Per [9] the most costly place to implement product 
changes are after operational testing or full-rate 
production as shown in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14.   Cost of design changes as a function of time 
(From: [9]). 
B. DESIGN METHODOLOGY FLAWS AND A SUGGESTED ALTERNATE 
DESIGN METHODOLOGY 
Clearly, the DMK is a poor solution to the moving map 
issue.  This statement can be made not only based on 
research presented above but also validated by nine of nine 
 47
pilots interviewed requesting the integration of a moving 
map despite the fact that one already exists in the DMK.  
The question is still begged: how did the DMK become the 
solution?  Per [49], the issue was timing.  NAVAIR realized 
that the block II Armed Helo navigation requirements could 
be solved by a moving map but was still limited by the FMC 
as previously discussed.  The MC was planned as an upgrade 
but would not be ready in time for block II incorporation.  
The solution was the DMK.  But given all the issues with a 
head-down display, why was this solution not rejected as 
inadequate as interview results so clearly indicated?  The 
answer could lay in the standard HCI design methodology 
utilized by Lockheed Martin.   
The primary issue in the design process could be the 
incorporation of previous designs in the generation of HCI 
requirements as described by [6].  This step calls for the 
“study of earlier similar systems to identify firmly 
established interface practices and standards [6, p. 9].  
The potential pitfall here is the earlier system being 
reviewed.  If that design is flawed, and that flaw was not 
recognized by the design team, the fundamental flaw has the 
potential to be carried over to the new design.  Give the 
discussion of head-down issues from above, the conclusion 
that this is precisely what happened in the DMK can be 
reasonably drawn. 
Although in itself the inclusion of a prior design is 
not a bad idea, somehow a useless moving map solution was 
still produced by the design methodology.  What can be done 
to help eliminate this chink in the design armor?  A better 
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and ultimately more efficient approach to cockpit design may 
be a design philosophy commonly known as Crew-Centered 
Design (CCD). 
1. Crew Centered Design Philosophy 
The Crew Centered Design (CCD) concept is similar to 
the Lockheed Martin/DoDAF methodology in that it professes 
the same iterative approach to design in which 
implementations are prototyped and tested.  It differs from 
the industry standard HCI systems engineering approach in 
that it is less of a rigid methodology and more of a 
philosophy and emphasizes a more holistic view of cockpit 
systems integration with flight crew usability as a key 
component of that system.  CCD places a much greater 
importance on input from experienced aircrew personnel “at 
the beginning of, and throughout, the cockpit design 
process” [50]. 
Although each instantiation of the industry standard 
iterative systems engineering process centered HCI design 
methodology may be different from organization to 
organization, generally, they all follow the model detailed 
in Figure 15.  This representation almost maps step for step 
to the Lockheed Martin process described in an earlier 




Figure 15.   Systems engineering iterative HCI design 
process (From [10]). 
While utilizing the general structure from Figure 14, 
the Crew Centered Design philosophy takes a completely 
different view of what is important in cockpit design.  It 
de-emphasizes the performance of individual components and 
the sterile implementation of functionality and instead 
views success as how well the crew and cockpit perform 
together in the accomplishment of a given task.  To this 
end, CCD places a much larger emphasis on the inclusion of 
the flight crew in every step of the design process [10].  
Fundamental components of CCD include: 
• Acknowledgement that the flight crew has the 
ultimate responsibility for the aircraft [51]. 
• Inclusion of the user (aircrew) more intimately in 
the design process [10]. 
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• Consider the usability of the cockpit as a major 
system such that it equivalent to engines and 
airframe integration [10]. 
• Total flight crew/flight deck performance is more 
important that performance of individual components 
[10, p. 7] 
• Test and evaluation should occur as early in the 
design process as possible to avoid implementation 
of poor design decisions [10]. 
The Crew-Centered Design philosophy applied to the 
traditional design methodology is depicted in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16.   Inserting the Crew-Centered Design philosophy 
in to the traditional design methodology (From: [10], 
p. 9]) 
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As its name implies, one of the major elements, if not 
the major element, is frequent and focused input by the 
experienced aircrews that may operate in that cockpit 
environment.   
An optimized design and analysis process [Crew-
Centered Philosophy] should take advantage of 
aircrew input.  The aircrew, as a user, can 
provide a tactical evaluation of the design 
product and provide valuable insights. [50, p. 1] 
2. Recommended Changes to Lockheed Martin HCI Design 
Methodology Based on the CCD Philosophy 
There are several areas on which the application of the 
CCD philosophy would enhance the Lockheed Martin design 
process.  These include: 
a. Use of Design Methodology Specifically 
Developed for Cockpit Design 
Design fundamentals and operating environments are 
not the same across the HCI spectrum.  Fundamentally the LM 
method and its successor DoDAF are a broad approach to 
general HCI design.  Given the highly dynamic environment of 
the flight deck, a set of very specific usability 
requirements exist.  Reference [52] argues that “In the 
complex, dynamic, tightly regulated environment of aviation, 
the challenge of performing a usability evaluation expands 
considerably in comparison to evaluation of traditional 
human-computer interaction (HCI) applications” [52, p. 396].  
Unlike other stationary systems that are captured by general 
HCI design methodologies aircrew face a much more dynamic 
and thus fundamentally different design context.  Regardless 
of the current task for the aircrew “The most important task 
 52
is aviating—keeping the flow of air over the wings such as 
to maintain lift [53, p. 460] That is exemplified in the 
flight school mantra of aviate, navigate, communicate!  
Regardless of secondary tasks these three tasks must still 
be accomplished with absolute precision since the price of 
failure usually catastrophic.  There is therefore a constant 
competition in the flight deck environment for the resource 
of pilot attention. 
The competing tasks involve maintaining situation 
awareness for hazards in the surrounding 
airspace, navigating to 3-D points in the sky, 
following procedures related to aircraft and 
airspace operations, communicating with air 
traffic control and other personnel on the flight 
deck, and monitoring system status. [53, p. 460] 
This specific task environment cannot be said of a 
user of a desktop terminal or even an operator of a 
sophisticated nuclear power plant control station for which 
a general HCI methodology would cover.  Reference [6] does 
attempt to make this point.  In step one, it directs systems 
engineers to capture “operational modes; and any special 
environmental conditions that must be accommodated by the 
system [6, p. 27].  Depending on the expediency of the 
project, this broad brush approach to capturing the 
operating environment has a lot of potential to miss crucial 
elements.  Plus, understanding that the fundamentals 
described above are common to any cockpit design, it seems a 
waste of resources to continually re-invent the wheel for 
each functional requirement. 
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b. Cost Effectiveness Must be Evaluated from a 
Holistic Standpoint 
Limiting cost as a design criteria: Per the 
Lockheed Martin method “the most cost-effective design 
alternative is selected [6, p. 26, Figure 6] during step 3 
of the iterative design process.   Although cost is an 
important element, it should not be applied as the bottom-
line selection criteria for each individual function.  CCD’s 
philosophy of viewing the system as more than the sum of its 
parts must also be applied to the cost criteria.  A 
functional requirement that costs more may in fact drive 
down the cost of a related function.  Thus, cost comparison 
may be better served by evaluating the effectiveness of 
aircrew tasks (or combinations of functions).  For example, 
if “navigation” was evaluated as a task, several functional 
requirements may be included in this grouping.  Since CCD is 
crew-centered and more dependent on “operator input and 
experience” [50, p. 1], there is a greater chance that 
aircrew will recognize that task accomplishment would be the 
criteria for success instead of simply meeting a functional 
requirement.  In short: meeting a functional requirement 
does not mean that the task is accomplished in the most 
efficient way. 
c. View the Cockpit as a Sum of Its Parts for 
Design Decisions 
Eliminate a function by function approach to 
design:  The current accepted cockpit design methodology 
used on the Common Cockpit evaluates each functional 
requirement as a pseudo standalone requirement.  CCD’s 
holistic aircrew centered approach would tie common 
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functional requirements together and address that the whole 
may in fact be greater than the sum of the parts.  It is 
easy to conclude that understanding the underlying need for 
geospatial situational awareness an experienced flight crew 
would immediately be able to connect the dots between 
different requirements for mapping.   
In the case of the Common Cockpit, the need for 
geospatial positioning is scattered throughout each 
different aircraft block requirement in the MH-60S ORD.  For 
this discussion the reader should note that this Common 
Cockpit requirements review has been limited to just the MH-
60S ORD  and does not factor in functional requirements 
defined in the MH-60R ORD.   
Block I aircraft, section 4.1.2 of [30], as well 
as section 4.2.4.1 of Block II requirements, requires that 
the “MH-60S Communications and Navigation subsystems are 
required that will enable aircraft to operate within the 
Global Air Traffic Management (GATM) system [30, p. 14].”  
The GATM:  
Is a concept for satellite-based communication, 
navigation, surveillance and air traffic 
management. The Federal Aviation Administration 
and the International Civil Aviation 
Organization, a special agency of the United 
Nations, established GATM standards in order to 
keep air travel safe and effective in 
increasingly crowded worldwide air space. [54] 
Block II navigation requirements are outlined in 
section 4.2.1.1 of [30].  The AMCM specific requirements 
state that the “cockpit displays shall provide the 
capability for the aircrew to maneuver the helicopter along 
a desired/selected track (p. 19).”  Unlike Block I and II 
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communication and navigation requirements, oddly Block III 
navigation and situational awareness requirements completely 
forgo any mention of GATM and instead section 4.3.9 
describes the functionality requirements of the DMK 
discussed in detail above [30].  Communications and 
navigation requirements are also outlined in the Other 
System Characteristics subsection (4.6) in sections 4.6.6 
and 4.6.7, respectively.  Neither section mentions GATM but 
4.6.7 outlines a functionality that could be construed as a 
situational awareness tool for GATM implementation: 
The MH-60S helicopter shall have the capability 
to pre-load (both electronically and manually) 
geo-referenced navigation waypoints and flight 
plans, and provide the ability to manipulate 
these waypoints/flight plans in flight.  The 
navigation system shall be capable of displaying 
to the pilots the position of surface contacts in 
and around the battle group. [30, sect. 4.6.7, p. 
35] 
A possible side effect of sprinkling functional 
requirements throughout, may be that the same functional 
requirement would be designed two different ways in two 
different projects.  In the case of GATM, the Common Cockpit 
had no specific resultant usability other than a basic 
avionics package and rudimentary mapping abilities discussed 
below.  This would then seem to meet the functional 
requirements specified by the MH-60S ORD sections discussed 
above.  However, when Lockheed Martin designed the glass 
cockpit for the improved avionics suite for the Air Force C-
5, the result was a true moving map based on Commercial-off-




others [55].  Of course without an in-depth analysis of the 
C-5 program, it is impossible to make this correlation with 
100 percent accuracy. 
Finding cockpit functional requirements should not 
be like hunting for Easter Eggs.  By eliminating the stoic 
focus on stove-piped design, CCD ties these initially 
disparate functional requirements together by recognizing 
that they all accomplish the same basic task of geospatial 
positioning.  The end design result would be a much better 
integrated mapping system that may potentially greatly 
reduce costs and improve system flexibility in the long run.  
The need to unify cockpit requirements in to one 
encompassing ORD is also a desire of the program manager per 
[35]. 
d. Carefully Consider Incorporating Previous 
Designs 
References [56] and [11] indicate that one of base 
designs for the CC was the Light Airborne Multipurpose 
System (LAMPS) MK III Block II program.  This is due to the 
fact that the MH-60R is a replacement for the current LAMPS 
SH-60B as stated earlier [4]. The LAMPS MK III system was 
introduced in 1983 and modified in 1992 [57].  Reference 
[11, sect. 6.2.2.1.1] states that mission display geo-
situational symbology was “designed to be compatible with 
the specifications for Naval Tactical Display Symbols (NTDS) 
to insure compatibility across Navy platforms.”  In keeping 
with good design practices, “an evolutionary—as opposed to 




display symbology was preserved. Having its roots in the 
1980s display technology, NTDS is a bare-bones graphical 
display in which: 
All the on-screen shape coding (including the 
contact and track shapes) is suggestive, in some 
way, of the object or parameter being represented 
in order to facilitate operator recognition. The 
top half of a geometric shape represents an air 
contact, an entire geometric shape represents a 
surface contact, and the lower half of a shape 
represents a subsurface contact. . The SAR 
Reference Point is the same shape as the "man 
overboard" Naval signal flag; the Pointer symbol 
consists of an arrow; the Torpedo Splash Point 
looks like a torpedo entering the water, and so 
on. [11, sect. 6.2.2.1.1] 
Did this requirement to incorporate an existing 
design per step three of [6] unduly influence the final 
navigation display?  Considering that the traditional 
navigation display of older U.S. Navy rotary–wing aircraft 
consists of green symbology on a black background (TACNAV of 
UH-3 first introduced in the 1960s, for example), one can 
compare that against the final CC design of Figure 17 and 




Figure 17.   The current navigation display of the CC 
(From: [11, Keys cockpit interface simulator]). 
It should be noted that the MH-60S ORD does not 
specifically state the need for a NTDS type display for 
navigation but does require the same general functionality 
per [30, sect. 4.6.7].  It should also be noted that 
utilizing the NTDS symbology in itself is not a bad idea as 
it leverages existing user knowledge.  However, sticking 
with the exact display environment despite clear potential 
for improvement could be considered a mistake. 
As such, it can be argued that the previous 
examples reviewed for the Common Cockpit are so far removed 
from an all-glass cockpit that their inclusion as a basis 
for design was more of a hindrance than help.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FURTHER STUDY 
A. CONCLUSION 
On paper, Lockheed Martin met every functional 
requirement specified in the ORD in relation to the Common 
Cockpit.  All applicable acquisitions instructions and 
design methodologies as required in the Department of 
Defense Directive 5000.1 were followed.  The cockpit was 
tested, evaluated and approved by the Program Manager and 
delivered to the user.  However, based on the results of the 
interview summarized in Appendix A and discussed throughout 
this thesis, the final design produced overlooked a critical 
display required to effectively and safely perform 
navigation tasks. In an attempt to fill this void, 
acquisition managers implemented a strap—on (kneeboard 
mounted) moving map system without adequate consideration to 
the usability of such a system. The result of this piecemeal 
approach to a moving map solution is the MH-60 cockpit in 
which the user is left wanting.  How did this happen?  
Perhaps the process itself is to blame. 
B. APPLYING CREW CENTERED DESIGN 
As argued above, the Lockheed Martin design 
methodology, which is now standardized in the DoDAF 
methodology [58], is inadequate for glass cockpit design.  
It is too broad-based and does not adequately capture the 
essence of modern cockpit design.  This failure manifested 
itself in the complete lack of a fully integrated moving 
map, despite the functional requirements (even with the 
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exclusion of the DMK requirements) and well-documented 
benefits to the aircrew for enhanced situational awareness.  
A better approach would be to detail glass cockpit 
specifics.  This recommendation is discussed in the 
“Recommendations” section of this thesis. 
If the CCD process was applied to the Common Cockpit 
requirements, what would the result be?  Without a full 
implementation of CCD, it is impossible to say.  However, a 
brief exploration of the CCD philosophy with regards to MH-
60S ORD defined functional requirements can be had with the 
following assumptions: 
• Step one of the CCD process (previous design, 
production, and operational experience, technology 
constraints) will only be considered.  The end goal 
of this evaluation is simply to fulfill the 
requirement of step one of [6, p. 9] to “generate an 
operational concept”. 
• The latest version of the MH-60S ORD will be 
considered [30]. 
• Current technology limitations of the Common Cockpit 
will be considered but will not be a limiting 
factor.  The assumption is that if a technology 
requirement exists, it is technology feasible to 
implement in the current common cockpit within 
reason. 
• The normal manning requirements for a HCI design 
team for step one is made up solely by the author. 
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1. Functional Requirements Evaluated 
As discussed above, Common Cockpit functional 
requirements are scattered throughout the MH-60S ORD.  
Grouping them together yields the following composite 
requirement: GATM capable (4.1.2); Maneuver the helicopter 
along a desired/selected track (4.2.1.1); kneeboard moving 
map which is usable during both unaided and Night Vision 
Device (NVD) flight (4.3.9); capability to preload geo-
navigation waypoints and display, display the pilots 
position relative to surface contacts via Global Positioning 
System (GPS) (4.6.7).  All requirements are from [30]. 
Even without the inclusion of the direct requirement to 
implement a kneeboard moving map in (4.3.9), in the author’s 
opinion, the sum of the requirements, as well as practical 
experience with in-flight navigations in the form of paper 
charts, would lead experienced flight crews providing 
operational experience in step one to the conclusion that 
the fundamental task being accomplished by these outlined 
functional requirements is that of geo-positional 
situational awareness for the flight crew. 
Finally, there are a host of considerations in choosing 
a moving map including perspective, orientation and size.  
But above all this there is the primary consideration: 
A primary Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) goal 
in specifying the new system is to enhance 
situational awareness (SA) and aircrew mission 
effectiveness without further burdening pilot 
task workload. [59, p. 1] 
It is by this guiding requirement that the operational 
concept shall be defined. 
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2. Mapping Options 
Now that the functional requirements have led the 
generation of an operational concept that includes a moving 
map, the team must determine what kind of moving map should 
be included.  This is a job for the knowledgeable Human 
Factors engineers on the team. 
One key to determining map orientation may be the 
context for which navigational directions are presented.  
Per [13, p. 110], “the language of the displays, in terms of 
ego-referenced directions like left, right, above or below, 
should match the language of the control that is also 
typically represented in such ego-referenced terms.”  The 
team should assume that if navigational directions are given 
to the pilot in terms of ego-centric commands like “turn 
left in 10 seconds,” then the map orientation should be 
direction up.  If commands are in the form of “turn north to 
a heading of 350 degrees,” then north up is a more 
appropriate directional context for the moving map.  The 
previous reference is known as ego-referenced or local 
guidance while the later is world referenced or global 
awareness [13, pp. 110, 113]. 
In [13] the two distinct views of Ego-Referenced 
Framework (ERF) or World-Referenced Framework (WRF) are 
described.  Ego-Referenced Frame (ERF) provides the “user 
centered” view in which the view is presented as if seen 
from the user’s eyes.  World-Referenced Framework (WRF) is 
less ecological in nature.  It presents a view in which the 
observer is able to orientate himself in the world of 
reference.  It is a view in which the ERF is just one part 
of the larger world.  Since Crew-Center Design places 
 63
emphasis on task accomplishment (in this case navigation), 
both perspectives will be viewed by the specific tasks they 
accomplish. 
It should be clarified that for the bulk of their 
discussion, [13] discusses WRF as a function of both a 
three-dimensional (3D) and two-dimensional (2D) display.  
For the purpose of this thesis, a three-dimension 
representation for WRF is ruled out for one primary reason: 
there are not currently enough navigational data points to 
present any WRF operating environment in 3D.  It should be 
noted that there is no reason to believe that a 3D 
environment suitable to WRF mapping as described in [13] 
could not be constructed in the near future.  Both airspace 
management, as well as operational environments, could be 
modeled in 3D, much as they are for simulators.  It is 
realistic to anticipate that near future operating 
environments will be mapped in 3D, much as Google Earth has 
done by converting 2D imagery into 3D maps.  Therefore, 3D 
should be a consideration for future upgrade plans. 
a. Ego-referenced Frame 
In [13, pp. 110-111] ERF is described as “ego-
referenced, forward viewing, zoom in, and 3D.”  ERF 
“mimic[s] the natural viewing of human observers as they 
walk through an environment [13, p. 111].”  Ego-referenced 
refers to one of the four cardinal eye points a viewer can 
have: egocentric, exocentric perspective, exocentric 2D plan 
view (Figure 17), and exocentric 2D side view (Figure 18).  
For the purposes of this discussion, ego-referenced and ego-




Figure 18.   Egocentric, Exocentric perspective, and 
Exocentric Plan-view displays (From: [12]) 
 
 
Figure 19.   A progression of viewpoints from ERF to 2D 
planar view.  Exocentric 2D side view is on the far 
right (After: [13]) 
Exocentric 2D side view 
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b. World-referenced Frame 
It can be stated that a 2D plan-view is nothing 
more than a specialized case of a 3D WRF in which there is 
no off-vertical-axis view.  Per [12], the 2D plan-view is 
described as akin to the 3D WRF from Figure 18, but “where 
the viewpoint is 90 degrees to the world’s plane.”  Despite 
the conversion from the 3D WRF to the specialized case of 
2D, the three fundamental features of WRF described by [13, 
p. 111] are still valid: 
(a) they may need to be world-referenced to 
support communications with others who may not 
share the same momentary ego-frame of reference; 
(b) they should soon out or be wide angle, 
representing a much broader region of the world 
than does a local guidance display; and (c) the 
need for three dimensionality that was inherent 
in local guidance displays is mitigated by the 
desirability of a world-referenced frame; this is 
because a 3D display must by definition assume a 
particular ego-referenced azimuth angle. 
3. 2D/3D Solution 
Although it presents some very unique benefits to 
geospatial situational awareness, as discussed by [13] and 
[12], 3D also carries with it some significant baggage in 
today’s cockpit.  Three-dimensional representations would be 
a significant perceptive leap from the 2D paper charts and 
video displays in use today by flight crews.  This may 
violate the “evolutionary, as opposed to revolutionary [51]” 




Although counterarguments [for 2D plan-view maps] 
have been made in aviation that a moving aircraft 
or stabilized world display is more compatible 
with the pilot’s mental model of the aircraft 
system (Johnson & Roscoe, 1972) and can provide 
as good performance. 
It may also be limited by the technical limitations of 
current or near future display technology.  To declare 3D as 
the primary source of navigation information for today’s 
Common Cockpit would therefore be a stretch at best.  To 
fully recognize the benefits of 3D, a Heads Up Display (HUD) 
and augmented reality, as discussed by [12], would have to 
be considered.  This extensive modification to the Common 
Cockpit is well beyond the scope of this thesis.  As a 
secondary source of geospatial reference, a simplified 
version of a 3D ERF display is a possibly, as will be 
discussed below. 
a. 2D Moving Map 
As discussed above, the benefits of a 2D plan-view 
moving map are undeniable.  The question then arises as to 
what features this moving map would incorporate? 
Through an interview of both fixed-wing and 
rotary-wing pilots utilizing several types of 2D WRF plan-
view maps [59] concluded the following: 
• Context switching (time to switch between 
different map views): “Faster is better 
accurately sums up the pilots’ preferences with 
regard to all three time-to-switch functions 
(switching map modes, switching chart scales, 
and command lat[itude]/lon[gitude] repositions 
 67
(p. 14).” No more than 1 second between context 
switches was generally acceptable (Section 
4.1.3). 
• Data update rates: In this case, faster is not 
better.  Pilots preferred 15Hz [updates per 
second] displays over 20Hz displays (p. 14, 
Section 4.1.3). 
• Map Positioning: North-up, track-up, centered, 
and decentered were considered.  Most pilots 
found that more often than not that track-up 
generally proved more useful than north-up but 
both had their advantages depending on the 
situation.  As discussed in [59, pp. 18, 19], 
pilots accomplished “certain tasks (e.g., 
reconnaissance) more effectively with a north-
up map (p 19).”  In both north-up and track-up, 
pilots preferred the ability to determine 
whether the aircraft was centered or de-
centered and to what degree off center the 
aircraft would be (Section 4.2.3). 
• Zooming: The ability to both zoom-in and zoom-
out on a map were shown to be beneficial.  Of 
particular interest is the quick zoom-out 
capability in which a pilot can quickly attain 
a larger global situational awareness picture 
and then zoom-in to the original scale with a 
single button push (Section 4.3.2). 
• Vector Moving Map Displays: Vector maps can 
have the same appearance and content of any 
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traditional chart but instead of being a 
digitally scanned picture of the chart are 
instead digitally rendered such that scaling 
and rotation have no effect on readability.  
“Vector maps are rendered from individually 
stored objects (p. 44).  These objects include 
anything that would be found on a traditional 
map “including lines (i.e. roads), points with 
associated symbols (i.e., airports), text 
features (e.g., city names), and areas (i.e., 
shaded metropolitan areas) (p. 44).”  Vector 
maps can also be modified on the fly by adding 
symbology and objects not originally found on 
the map.  It was concluded by [59] that the 
advantages vector maps had over digitally 
scanned maps were numerous.  Of note “virtually 
all helicopter pilots gave all three 
capabilities (keeping text upright, selectively 
de-cluttering, and adding detail) the highest 
possible rating (extremely useful) [p. 45, 
sect. 4.6.2]. 
Map sources should include all navigational charts 
(including Digital Aeronautical Flight Information File 
(DAFIF) data) and tactical charts currently available to 
aircrew.  In addition, satellite imagery should be included 
to capture areas not covered by existing charts.  A hybrid 
between both types of maps would be ideal in order to 
provide the pilot with the maximum amount of geographical 
data available.  The hybrid feature found on many on-line 
mapping tools such as MapQuest © and Google Earth © provide 
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excellent examples of this concept.  These functional 
requirements are outlined in section 4.3.9 of [30]:  
Moving-map shall be capable of pre-flight loading 
and in-flight display of National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) raster product format 
data and vector data that incorporates and 
overlays geo-referenced navigation and 
waypoint/flight data onto a common map 
background. 
The MFD moving map design described above has many 
traits in common with the current DMK implementation.  This 
follows as much of the functional requirements of a MFD 
integrated moving map are found in the DMK.  Thus, in 
keeping with the philosophy of leveraging existing 
“engineering experiences [6, p. 26]” when developing new 
designs, the DMK interface will be used as a basis.  The 
reader should keep in mind that interview complaints about 
the DMK had more to do with the kneeboard implementation 
than the actual interface.  That said, a one-for-one copy of 
the DMK interface is not the solution.  A more specific 
interview on the likes and dislikes of the DMK interface 
should be conducted to eliminate the wheat from the chaff 
and identify any interface issues. 
Inclusion of the DMK interface in the design 
concept also brings in to play FalconView©.  Just like the 
reuse of DMK in order to leverage existing aircrew training, 
this system will be based on FalconView© and Portable Flight 
Planning Software (PFPS) commonly in use throughout military 
aviation.  FalconView©: 
Is a non-proprietary GOTS (Government Off-The-
Shelf) application for analyzing and displaying 
geographical data crucial to the warfighter. Its 
ease of use and wide variety of applications have 
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made it the system of choice for the warfighter 
and the standard for data interchange in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. [60, p. 1] 
The primary benefit of FalconView© is it “supports 
a robust set of programmer interfaces, which allow diverse 
applications to fuse their information into a single 
coherent picture of the user’s area of interest [60, p. 2].”  
Areas of interest could include a benign flight across the 
United States or a more hostile flight in to enemy 
territory.  Either way it is captured.  The ability to port 
this data directly to a moving map display is extremely 
useful and is without doubt the primary motivation behind 
its usage on the DMK.  Using FalconView © is also in keeping 
with the spirit of incorporating “evolutionary—as opposed to 
revolutionary [51] changes in the cockpit. 
One major issue with integrating FalconView© into 
the MFD moving map solution is the question of in-flight 
planning.  Since the DMK is a fully functioning native 
Windows XP© operating environment, there is a one-to-one 
mapping of FalconView© usability from the PFPS laptops in 
the squadron to the DMK in the aircraft.  The operating 
environment and user interface devices in the common cockpit 
are significantly different and present a challenge to the 
functionality of in-flight user updates.  Although this 
functionality was not specifically identified in the MH-60S 
ORD, it is an issue that must be addressed.  The primary 
issue is therefore whether a technical limitation exists in 
the cockpit environment that would prevent all of the 
FalconView© flight planning functionality from being 
available.  This would warrant a closer examination and is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  To that end the assumption 
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will be made that at least limited flight planning 
functionality is available in the MFD moving map design as 
detailed in the existing functional requirements from 
section 4.6.7 in which the system shall “provide the ability 
to manipulate these waypoints/flight plans in flight.” 
b. 3D ERF FLIR 
A more radical design departure from the current 
common cockpit convention would be the integration of a 
pseudo 3D ERF display to assist the non-flying pilot with 
Geo-positional situational awareness.  This design would be 
pseudo in the fact that true 3D would is technically limited 
in the current common cockpit.  The goal is to attempt to 
capture a more ego-referenced display since “(ego 
referenced) maps support better navigation performance, as 
these tend to both to alleviate mental rotation and provide 
a left-right display frame of reference that is compatible 
and congruent with the frame of reference of the control” 
[13, p. 113]. 
A true 3D ego-centric ERF display would most 
likely involve the projection of a 3D environment on some 
type of heads-up display, as described in [12].  
Acknowledging realistic technical limitations, the goal of 
this ERF implementation would be to assist the non-flying 
pilot with navigational reference under the assumption that 
he or she would be “backing up” the flying pilot as is often 




The operating environment for this implementation 
would be in a tactical situation in which local guidance is 
the preferred means of navigation as outlined in [59].  Such 
missions include NVD Nap-of-the-Earth (NOE) flights, as well 
as overwater surveillance missions. 
The design would superimpose current HUD symbology 
found on the NVD kit to the MFD FLIR image.  The FLIR image 
data would provide the ego-centric view found associated 
with a 3D ERF while the HUD projection would help the non-
flying pilot reference the current condition of the 
aircraft.  This display would thus provide both geo-
positional data as well as aircraft status in one glance.  
The reason this data would be designed for the non-flying 
pilot is that the majority of the viewing is done while 
scanning inside the aircraft (MFD scan) and not outside as 
is the case for tactical environments. 
The inclusion of this functionality has the added 
benefit of including both the ERF and WRF perspectives.  As 
discussed in [12] and [13], this is the ideal solution. 
4. Symbology and Color Scheme 
The Department of Defense Interface Standard—Aircraft 
Display Symbology (MIL-STD-1787C) is the standard for 
display symbology throughout the Department of Defense.  It: 
Defines the symbology requirements for a primary 
flight reference and describes some fundamental 
relationships between symbol motion and aircraft 
system states. It describes symbols, symbol 
formats, and information content for electro-
optical displays that provide aircrew members 




following/terrain avoidance, weapon delivery, and 
landing. It also provides (in appendixes) non-
binding information on symbolgy, geometry, fonts, 
recommended dimensions, and mechanizations. [61, 
p. 1] 
Given the depth and breadth of this document, the 
design team will use it as the standard for display 
symbology. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The intended scope of this thesis is an examination of 
the Common Cockpit associated with the MH-60S and MH-60R and 
recommendations on the improvement of that program will be 
made.  Some of these recommendations, however, are more 
broad-based and applicable to the entire defense 
acquisitions process outlined in [62], as it relates to 
glass-cockpit design.  Recommendations are thus divided into 
these two categories. 
1. Common Cockpit Recommendations 
The author is keenly aware that in reality the chance 
of a complete redesign of the Common Cockpit due to cost 
alone is slim.  In relation to “trade-offs” with the current 
common cockpit, cost would seem the only issue as the basic 
technological requirements are already in place.  Realistic 
recommendations are thus: 
Implement a moving map: Nine of nine pilots interviewed 
said an integrated MFD moving map would greatly improve geo-
spatial situational awareness during every aspect of flight 
regardless of mission.  NAVAIR as well recognized this fact 
and developed the practically useless DMK as noted earlier.  
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Considering the positive impact a truly MFD integrated 
moving map would have, NAVAIR should expedite this design 
well ahead of the current plan to field it in 2016, assuming 
it gets funded [35].  It should be noted that Lockheed 
Martin, as a result of the IRAD discussed above, has already 
developed a prototype moving map that integrates graphical 
map overlays (navigational maps, etc.) with the existing 
NTDS style symbology found in the current Common Cockpit. 
Reprogram the Common Cockpit: Elevate the Common 
Cockpit program to an Acquisitions Category (ACAT) instead 
of its current 845 status.  This will help ensure 
requirements are clearly stated and allow better management 
of costs and funding. 
2. Defense Acquisitions Recommendations 
Implement Crew Centered Design in the DoD acquisitions 
process:  In today’s modern computer centric aircraft, 
reliability of the aircraft as a system is rapidly being 
overshadowed by usability as the number one design issue.  
Appendix eight of [62] clearly recognizes this shift and 
states the Program Manager of a DoD acquisitions program: 
Shall have a plan for [Human Systems Integration 
(HSI)] in place early in the acquisition process 
to optimize total system performance, minimize 
total ownership costs, and ensure that the system 
is built to accommodate the characteristics of 
the user population that will operate, maintain, 
and support the system. [p. 60] 
Enclosure eight continues by discussing a broad range 
of issued including training and survivability.  Although 
necessary at a high level, this broad-brush approach to HSI 
is insufficient when dealing with cockpit design, as 
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evidenced by the Common Cockpit.  Given the complexity of 
the modern cockpit, associated pilot workload and the 
uniqueness of the cockpit operating environment, a very 
specific methodology must be outlined to address its design 
and implementation.  To this end [62] should specifically 
name Crew Centered Design as the sole method of manned 
cockpit design. 
Refine ORDs to be as specific as possible to reflect 
user needs:  Ensure that Operation Requirements Documents 
(ORD) or Initial Capabilities Documents (ICD) as described 
in [62] are written as clear and concise as possible.  
Functional requirements should be justified via sound 
scientific methods and well understood by the Program 
Manager.  Acquisitions professionals should understand that 
the contractor is bound by the contract to provide what is 
asked for, not necessarily what is needed. 
Combine efforts across DoD to produce a truly Common 
Cockpit:  Expand the notion of cross platform cockpit 
commonality by following the example of the U.S. Army’s 
Common Avionics Architecture System (CAAS), in which the 
same basic cockpit architecture is used in the Army’s 
extensive fleet of dissimilar rotary-wing aircraft.  By 
combining resources and leveraging the existing development 
experience, the Navy can make the next generation of Common 
Cockpit truly common by employing it across all new 
Navy/Marine Corps rotary-wing aircraft.  This is not to say 
there will not be differences between cockpits, but it is an 
acknowledgement that the fundamentals of aviate, navigate, 
communicate are common functional requirements of any 
cockpit. 
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Examine the integration of Human System Integration 
across all acquisitions projects that have human-machine 
interactions:  Although this thesis is specific to the 
Common Cockpit, this issue is just one example of the much 
broader issue of usability across all human-machine 
interaction.  HSI applies as much to cockpits as it does to 
any type of device that requires direct human interaction.  
In fact, the fundamental usability of a cockpit is not that 
much different than that of a door handle: the design must 
be usable or it will not get used.  Through the use of 
methodologies such as CCD briefly described in this thesis, 
the acquisitions process must seek proven and effective ways 
to integrate HSI with existing industry design practices and 
standards for the HSI requirements of [62] to become truly 
effective. 
D. FUTURE WORK 
During the interview conducted in San Diego, 
respondents identified two potential areas of research in to 
Common Cockpit shortcoming.  These include: 
• Two interview subjects recommended the integration 
of a Flight Management System for improved airway 
navigation.  An example of this is Sikorsky’s glass 
cockpit solution and with an integrated FMS 800 
[63]. 
• Five of nine interview subjects indicated 
dissatisfaction with the several aspects of the 
Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) implementation to 
include image display size and the usefulness of the 
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Hand Control Unit (HCU).  Further exploration in 
this direction is warranted. 
• Four of nine pilots interviewed expressed some level 
of dissatisfaction with the current PKI / FFK layout 
and menu depth associated with these keys.  Further 
exploration in to the usability of the current setup 
against the guidelines established in NAWCADPAX 
“Situational Awareness Guidelines.” 
• Explore the possibility of an ego-centric 3D 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW RESULTS SUMMARY 
Nine subjects were interviewed over a three-day period.  
Although scheduled to last one half of an hour, the 
interviews lasted on average an hour.  A summary of 
questions asked in Appendix A are provided below. 
A. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
• Total hours (median): 1300 
• Total MH-60S hours (median): 1000 
• Total previous qualified Helicopter in a different 
series: 2 
B. QUESTION SUMMARIES 
The following represents a summary of the questions 
asked during the interview process.  Although some themes 
were common throughout the interviews, some subjects brought 
out unique ideas and observations. 
1. What MH-60S missions are you most familiar with? 
(SAR, LOG, MEDEVAC, etc.): 
All the subjects were familiar with the basic FRS 
missions, including Search and Rescue (SAR), Logistics 
(LOG),and basic flight familiarity training (FAM).  All were 
also familiar with Armed Helo mission (TACTICS), although 





2. Given your experience in the above missions you 
highlighted, tell me about instances for which you 
may have experienced difficulties with the cockpit 
interface while conducting those missions: 
A wide variety of issues where presented.  Concepts are 
grouped below: 
• Multifunction Display (MFD) readability: Initial 
boot contrast defaults to the lowest setting thus 
requiring the user to adjust contrast to a higher 
setting to be readable.  Also, several magenta 
colored displays (needles and heading settings) were 
not readable, particularly on the edges of the 
viewing area. 
• Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) Hand Control Unit 
(HCU): 
• What are your general likes and dislikes with the 
cockpit interface? 
• Likes 
• The joystick interface pointing device was mentioned 
as effective.  However, the variable rate in which 
scroll rate is somewhat proportional to joystick 
displacement took practice to master. 
• Dislikes 
• Layered menus were almost universally mentioned as 
an issue.  Specifically mentioned was the three step 
process of switching the IFF transponder from 
“Transmit” to “Standby.” 
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3. Are there any other MH-60S interface issues that 
you would like to describe or may be relevant to 
this study? 
This question almost completely revolved around the 
elimination of the current kneeboard implementation of the 
moving map functionality and replacing it with an integrated 
moving map display in the Mission Display (MD). 
4. Finally, if there was something you could change 
about the cockpit, what would it be? 
By the end of the interview process, this question was 
both asked and answered as a result of discussions from 
questions c and d above.  However, a few subjects mentioned 
other items not previously discussed during their interview, 
including the need for more comfortable pilot seats, better 
visibility from the cockpit, and unified helmet cord that 
integrates Internal Communications Systems (ICS) and all 
Night Vision Device (NVD) functionality.  Also mentioned was 
changing the airspeed indication tape to a more readable 
format and a way for aircrewmen to monitor aircraft altitude 
in low-level situations. 
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